Zitat

On 8 October 2019, the mishap pilot (MP), flying a F-16CJ, tail number (T/N) 91-0340, assigned to the 480th Fighter Squadron, "the Warhawks," 52d Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, conducted a routine training sortie as part of the wing's local readiness exercise SABER FURY. Shortly after take-off, at 15:10:42 hours local time, the MP ejected from the mishap aircraft (MA) with no injuries. The MA was destroyed upon impact in a forested area at 15:11:24L 8 nautical miles south of the base. The mishap resulted in zero military or civilian casualties and the loss of a $25,551,000 United States government asset.

The mishap flight was planned and authorized as a suppression of enemy air defenses training mission within the local training airspace. The MP was flying as number two of a scheduled 4-ship formation, but which departed as a 3-ship. The prevailing weather at the airfield, and in the surrounding area, was a ceiling at 500 feet with instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) up to 15,000 feet. Approximately 13 seconds after take-off, during the transition to IMC, the MA experienced a power disruption causing a partial electrical power loss (also known as an electrical "brownout") which failed the MP's primary flight and navigation instruments without corresponding fault or failure indications. This power disruption also caused the embedded global positioning and inertial navigation set (EGI) to lose power and remain off-line. The subsequent degradation and mismatch in data between the primary and standby instruments caused the pilot to become spatially disoriented at low altitude and in IMC. After two failed attempts to activate the pilot activated recovery system, following two instances of visually acquiring trees below the 500-foot ceiling, the MP successfully egressed the aircraft.

The Accident Investigation Board President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was the combination of two factors. First, the MA experienced a partial electrical power loss (brownout). The power loss caused a cascading failure of the EGI and the MP's primary flight and navigation instruments. Due to the EGI's loss of power, the primary attitude direction indicator continued to display unreliable data without fault or failure indications and prevented the MP from transitioning fully to the standby attitude indicator for attitude reference. Second, the weather conditions at the time of the power disruption caused the MP to rely on his primary and standby flight instruments to maintain aircraft control during a critical phase of flight. The mismatch in data provided by the primary and standby attitude indicators, due to the power disruption, caused the MP to become spatially disoriented and unable to maintain aircraft control in the weather and at low altitude. The absence of either factor may have prevented this mishap.